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Abstract
We present CDStore, which disperses users’ backup data
across multiple clouds and provides a unified multi-
cloud storage solution with reliability, security, and cost-
efficiency guarantees. CDStore builds on an augmented
secret sharing scheme called convergent dispersal, which
supports deduplication by using deterministic content-
derived hashes as inputs to secret sharing. We present
the design of CDStore, and in particular, describe how
it combines convergent dispersal with two-stage dedupli-
cation to achieve both bandwidth and storage savings and
be robust against side-channel attacks. We evaluate the
performance of our CDStore prototype using real-world
workloads on LAN and commercial cloud testbeds. Our
cost analysis also demonstrates that CDStore achieves a
monetary cost saving of 70% over a baseline cloud stor-
age solution using state-of-the-art secret sharing.
1 Introduction
Cloud storage provides cost-efficient means for organi-
zations to host backups off-site [40]. However, from
users’ perspectives, putting all data in one cloud raises
reliability concerns regarding the single point of fail-
ure [8] and vendor lock-in [5], especially when cloud
storage providers can spontaneously terminate their busi-
ness [35]. Cloud storage also raises security concerns,
since data management is now outsourced to third par-
ties. Users often want their outsourced data to be pro-
tected with guarantees of confidentiality (i.e., data is kept
secret from unauthorized parties) and integrity (i.e., data
is uncorrupted).
Multi-cloud storage coalesces multiple public cloud
storage services into a single storage pool, and provides
a plausible way to realize both reliability and security
in outsourced storage. It disperses data with some form
of redundancy across multiple clouds, operated by inde-
pendent vendors, such that the stored data can be recov-
ered from a subset of clouds even if the remaining clouds
are unavailable. Redundancy can be realized through
erasure coding (e.g., Reed-Solomon codes [51]) or se-
cret sharing (e.g., Shamir’s scheme [54]). Recent multi-
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cloud storage systems (e.g., [5, 19, 29, 33, 60]) leverage
erasure coding to tolerate cloud failures, but do not ad-
dress security; DepSky [13] uses secret sharing to further
achieve both reliability and security. Secret sharing often
comes with high redundancy, yet its variants are shown
to reduce the redundancy of secret sharing to be slightly
higher than that of erasure coding, while achieving secu-
rity in the computational sense (see §2). Secret sharing
has a side benefit of providing keyless security (i.e., elim-
inating encryption keys), which builds on the difficulty
for an attacker to compromise multiple cloud services
rather than a secret key. This removes the key manage-
ment overhead as found in key-based encryption [56].
However, existing secret sharing algorithms prohibit
storage savings achieved by deduplication. Since backup
data carries substantial identical content [58], organiza-
tions often use deduplication to save storage costs, by
keeping only one physical data copy and having it shared
by other copies with identical content. On the other hand,
secret sharing uses random pieces as inputs when gen-
erating dispersed data. Users embed different random
pieces, making the dispersed data different even if the
original data is identical.
This paper presents a new multi-cloud storage system
called CDStore, which makes the first attempt to provide
a unified cloud storage solution with reliability, secu-
rity, and cost efficiency guarantees. CDStore builds on
our prior proposal of an enhanced secret sharing scheme
called convergent dispersal [37], whose core idea is to
replace the random inputs of traditional secret sharing
with deterministic cryptographic hashes derived from the
original data, while the hashes cannot be inferred by at-
tackers without knowing the whole original data. This
allows deduplication, while preserving the reliability and
keyless security features of secret sharing. Using con-
vergent dispersal, CDStore offsets dispersal-level redun-
dancy due to secret sharing by removing content-level
redundancy via deduplication, and hence achieves cost
efficiency. To summarize, we extend our prior work [37]
and make three new contributions.
First, we propose a new instantiation of convergent
dispersal called CAONT-RS, which builds on AONT-RS
[52]. CAONT-RS maintains the properties of AONT-RS,
and makes two enhancements: (i) using OAEP-based
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AONT [20] to improve performance and (ii) replacing
random inputs with deterministic hashes to allow dedu-
plication. Our evaluation also shows that CAONT-RS
generates dispersed data faster than our prior AONT-RS-
based instantiation [37].
Second, we present the design and implementation of
CDStore. It adopts two-stage deduplication, which first
deduplicates data of the same user on the client side to
save upload bandwidth, and then deduplicates data of
different users on the server side to further save storage.
Two-stage deduplication works seamlessly with conver-
gent dispersal, achieves bandwidth and storage savings,
and is robust against side-channel attacks [27, 28]. We
also carefully implement CDStore to mitigate computa-
tion and I/O bottlenecks.
Finally, we thoroughly evaluate our CDStore proto-
type using both microbenchmarks and trace-driven ex-
periments. We use real-world backup and virtual im-
age workloads, and conduct evaluation on both LAN
and commercial cloud testbeds. We show that CAONT-
RS encoding achieves around 180MB/s with only two-
thread parallelization. We also identify the bottlenecks
when CDStore is deployed in a networked environment.
Furthermore, we show via cost analysis that CDStore can
achieve a monetary cost saving of 70% via deduplication
over AONT-RS-based cloud storage.
2 Secret Sharing Algorithms
We conduct a study of the state-of-the-art secret shar-
ing algorithms. A secret sharing algorithm operates by
transforming a data input called secret into a set of coded
outputs called shares, with the primary goal of providing
both fault tolerance and confidentiality guarantees for the
secret. Formally, a secret sharing algorithm is defined
based on three parameters (n, k, r): an (n, k, r) secret
sharing algorithm (where n > k > r ≥ 0) disperses a
secret into n shares such that (i) the secret can be recon-
structed from any k shares, and (ii) the secret cannot be
inferred (even partially) from any r shares.
The parameters (n, k, r) define the protection strength
of a secret sharing algorithm. Specifically, n and k de-
termine the fault tolerance degree of a secret, such that
the secret remains available as long as any k out of n
shares are accessible. In other words, it can tolerate the
loss of n − k shares. The parameter r determines the
confidentiality degree of a secret, such that the secret re-
mains confidential as long as no more than r shares are
compromised by an attacker. On the other hand, a secret
sharing algorithm makes the trade-off of incurring addi-
tional storage. We define the storage blowup as the ratio
of the total size of n shares to the size of the original se-
cret. Note that the storage blowup must be at least nk , as
the secret is recoverable from any k out of n shares.
Several secret sharing algorithms have been proposed
Algorithm Confidentiality
degree
Storage
blowup†
SSSS [54] r = k − 1 n
IDA [50] r = 0 n
k
RSSS [16] r ∈ [0, k − 1] n
k−r
SSMS [34] r = k − 1 n
k
+ n · Skey
Ssec
AONT-RS [52] r = k − 1 n
k
+ n
k
· Skey
Ssec
† Ssec: size of a secret; Skey : size of a random key.
Table 1: Comparison of secret sharing algorithms.
in the literature. Table 1 compares them in terms of the
confidentiality degree and the storage blowup, subject to
the same n and k. Two extremes of secret sharing algo-
rithms are Shamir’s secret sharing scheme (SSSS) [54]
and Rabin’s information dispersal algorithm (IDA) [50].
SSSS achieves the highest confidentiality degree (i.e.,
r = k − 1), but its storage blowup is n (same as repli-
cation). IDA has the lowest storage blowup nk , but its
confidentiality degree is the weakest (i.e., r = 0), and
any share can reveal the information of the secret. Ramp
secret sharing scheme (RSSS) [16] generalizes both IDA
and SSSS to make a trade-off between the confidential-
ity degree and the storage blowup. It evenly divides a
secret into k − r pieces, and generates r additional ran-
dom pieces of the same size. It then transforms the k
pieces into n shares using IDA.
Secret sharing made short (SSMS) [34] combines IDA
and SSSS using traditional key-based encryption. It first
encrypts the secret with a random key and then disperses
the encrypted secret and the key using IDA and SSSS,
respectively. Its storage blowup is slightly higher than
that of IDA, while it has the highest confidentiality de-
gree r = k − 1 as in SSSS. Note that the confidentiality
degree is defined in the computational sense, that is, it is
computationally infeasible to break the encryption algo-
rithm without knowing the key.
AONT-RS [52] further reduces the storage blowup of
SSMS, while preserving the highest confidentiality de-
gree r = k−1 (in the computational sense). It combines
Rivest’s all-or-nothing transform (AONT) [53] for con-
fidentiality and Reed-Solomon coding [17, 51] for fault
tolerance. It first transforms the secret into an AONT
package with a random key, such that an attacker can-
not infer anything about the AONT package unless the
whole package is obtained. Specifically, it splits a secret
into a number s ≥ 1 of words, and adds an extra ca-
nary word for integrity checking. It masks each of the
s words by XOR’ing it with an index value encrypted
by a random key. The s masked words are placed at the
start of an AONT package. One more word, obtained
by XOR’ing the same random key with the hash of the
masked words, is added to the end of the AONT package.
The final AONT package is then divided into k equal-size
shares, which are encoded into n shares using a system-
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Figure 1: CDStore architecture.
atic Reed-Solomon code (a systematic code means that
the n shares include the original k shares).
The security of existing secret sharing algorithms lies
in the embedded random inputs (e.g., a random key in
AONT-RS). Due to randomness, secrets with identical
content lead to distinct sets of shares, thereby prohibiting
deduplication. This motivates CDStore, which enables
secret sharing with deduplication.
3 CDStore Design
CDStore is designed for an organization to outsource the
storage of data of a large group of users to multiple cloud
vendors. It builds on the client-server architecture, as
shown in Figure 1. Each user of the same organization
runs the CDStore client to store and access its data in
multiple clouds over the Internet. In each cloud, a co-
locating virtual machine (VM) instance owned by the
organization runs the CDStore server between multiple
CDStore clients and the cloud storage backend.
CDStore targets backup workloads. We consider a
type of backups obtained by snapshotting some applica-
tions, file systems, or virtual disk images. Backups gen-
erally have significant identical content, and this makes
deduplication useful. Field measurements on backup
workloads show that deduplication can reduce the stor-
age overhead by 10× on average, and up to 50× in some
cases [58]. In CDStore deployment, each user machine
submits a series of backup files (e.g., in UNIX tar for-
mat) to the co-located CDStore client, which then pro-
cesses the backups and uploads them to all clouds.
3.1 Goals and Assumptions
We state the design goals and assumptions of CDStore in
three aspects: reliability, security, and cost efficiency.
Reliability: CDStore tolerates failures of cloud storage
providers and even CDStore servers. Outsourced data is
accessible if a tolerable number of clouds (and their co-
locating CDStore servers) are operational. CDStore also
tolerates client-side failures by offloading metadata man-
agement to the server side (see §4.3). In the presence
of cloud failures, CDStore reconstructs original secrets
and then rebuilds the lost shares as in Reed-Solomon
codes [51]. We do not consider cost-efficient repair [29].
Security: CDStore exploits multi-cloud diversity to
ensure confidentiality and integrity of outsourced data
against outsider attacks, as long as a tolerable number
of clouds are uncompromised. Note that the confiden-
tiality guarantee requires that the secrets be drawn from
a very large message space, so that brute-force attacks
are infeasible [10]. CDStore also uses two-stage dedu-
plication (see §3.3) to avoid insider side-channel attacks
[27, 28] launched by malicious users. Here, we do not
consider strong attack models, such as Byzantine faults
in cloud services [13]. We also assume that the client-
server communication over the network is protected, so
that an attacker cannot infer the secrets by eavesdropping
the transmitted shares.
Cost efficiency: CDStore uses deduplication to reduce
both bandwidth and storage costs. It also incurs limited
overhead in computation (e.g., VM usage) and storage
(e.g., metadata). We assume that there is no billing for
the communication between a co-locating VM and the
storage backend of the same cloud, based on today’s pric-
ing models of most cloud vendors [30].
3.2 Convergent Dispersal
Convergent dispersal enables secret sharing with dedu-
plication by replacing the embedded random input with a
deterministic cryptographic hash derived from the secret.
Thus, two secrets with identical content must generate
identical shares, making deduplication possible. Also,
it is computationally infeasible to infer the hash with-
out knowing the whole secret. Our idea is inspired by
convergent encryption [24] used in traditional key-based
encryption, in which the random key is replaced by the
cryptographic hash of the data to be encrypted. Figure 2
shows the main idea of how we augment a secret sharing
algorithm with convergent dispersal.
This paper proposes a new instantiation of conver-
gent dispersal called CAONT-RS, which inherits the re-
liability and security properties of the original AONT-
RS, and makes two key modifications. First, to improve
performance, CAONT-RS replaces Rivest’s AONT [53]
with another AONT based on optimal asymmetric en-
cryption padding (OAEP) [11, 20]. The rationale is that
Rivest’s AONT performs multiple encryptions on small-
size words (see §2), while OAEP-based AONT performs
a single encryption on a large-size, constant-value block.
Also, OAEP-based AONT provably provides no worse
security than any AONT scheme [20]. Second, CAONT-
RS replaces the random key in AONT with a determin-
istic cryptographic hash derived from the secret. Thus,
it preserves content similarity in dispersed shares and al-
lows deduplication. Our prior work [37] also proposes
instantiations for RSSS [16] and AONT-RS (based on
Rivest’s AONT) [52]. Our new CAONT-RS shows faster
encoding performance than our prior AONT-RS-based
instantiation (see §5.3).
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Figure 2: Idea of convergent dispersal.
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Figure 3: Example of CAONT-RS with n = 4 and k = 3.
We now elaborate on the encoding and decoding of
CAONT-RS, both of which are performed by a CDStore
client. Figure 3 shows an example of CAONT-RS with
n = 4 and k = 3 (and hence r = k − 1 = 2).
Encoding: We first transform a given secret X into a
CAONT package. Specifically, we first generate a hash
key h, instead of a random key, derived from X using a
(optionally salted) hash functionH (e.g., SHA-256):
h = H(X). (1)
To achieve confidentiality, we transform (X,h) into
a CAONT package (Y, t) using OAEP-based AONT,
where Y and t are the head and tail parts of the CAONT
package and have the same size as X and h, respectively.
To elaborate, Y is generated by:
Y = X ⊕G(h), (2)
where ‘⊕’ is the XOR operator and G is a generator
function that takes h as input and constructs a mask block
with the same size as X . Here, we implement the gener-
atorG as:
G(h) = E(h,C), (3)
where C is a constant-value block with the same size as
X , and E is an encryption function (e.g., AES-256) that
encrypts C using h as the encryption key.
The tail part t is generated by:
t = h⊕H(Y ). (4)
Finally, we divide the CAONT package into k equal-
size shares (we pad zeroes to the secret if necessary to
ensure that the CAONT package can be evenly divided).
We encode them into n shares using the systematic Reed-
Solomon codes [17, 46, 47, 51].
To enable deduplication, we ensure that the same share
is located in the same cloud. Since the number of clouds
for multi-cloud storage is usually small, we simply dis-
perse shares to all clouds. Suppose that CDStore spans
n clouds, which we label 0, 1, · · · , n − 1. After encod-
ing each secret using convergent dispersal, we label the
n generated shares 0, 1, · · · , n − 1 in the order of their
positions in the Reed-Solomon encoding result, such that
share i is to be stored on cloud i, where 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1.
This ensures that the same cloud always receives the
same share from the secrets with identical content, ei-
ther generated by the same user or different users. This
also enables us to easily locate the shares during restore.
Decoding: To recover the secret, we retrieve any k out of
n shares and use them to reconstruct the original CAONT
package (Y, t). Then we deduce hash h by XOR’ing t
withH(Y ) (see Equation (4)). Finally, we deduce secret
X by XOR’ing Y withG(h) (see Equation (2)), and re-
move any padded zeroes introduced in encoding.
We can also verify the integrity of the deduced secret
X . We simply generate a hash value from the deduced
X as in Equation (1) and compare if it matches h. If the
match fails, then the decoded secret is considered to be
corrupted. To obtain a correct secret, we can follow a
brute-force approach, in which we try a different subset
of k shares until the secret is correctly decoded [19].
Remarks: We briefly discuss the security properties of
CAONT-RS. CAONT-RS ensures confidentiality against
outsider attacks, provided that an attacker cannot gain
unauthorized accesses to k out of n clouds, and ensures
integrity through the embedded hash in each secret. It
leverages AONT to ensure that no information of the
original secret can be inferred from fewer than k shares.
We note that an attacker can identify the deduplication
status of the shares of different users and perform brute-
force dictionary attacks [9, 10] inside the clouds, and we
require that the secrets be drawn from a large message
space (see §3.1). To mitigate brute-force attacks, we may
replace the hash key in CAONT-RS with a more sophisti-
cated key generated by a key server [9], with the trade-off
of introducing the key management overhead.
3.3 Two-Stage Deduplication
We first overview how deduplication works. Deduplica-
tion divides data into fixed-size or variable-size chunks.
This work assumes variable-size chunking, which de-
fines boundaries based on content and is robust to con-
tent shifting. Each chunk is uniquely identified by a fin-
gerprint computed by a cryptographic hash of the chunk
content. Two chunks are said to be identical if their fin-
gerprints are the same, and fingerprint collisions of two
different chunks are very unlikely in practice [15]. Dedu-
plication stores only one copy of a chunk, and refers any
duplicate chunks to the copy via small-size references.
To realize deduplication in cloud storage, a naı¨ve ap-
proach is to perform global deduplication on the client
side. Specifically, before a user uploads data to a cloud,
it first generates fingerprints of the data. It then checks
with the cloud by fingerprint for the existence of any du-
plicate data that has been uploaded by any user. Finally,
it uploads only the unique data to the cloud. Although
client-side global deduplication saves upload bandwidth
and storage overhead, it is susceptible to side-channel
attacks [27, 28]. One side-channel attack is to infer the
existence of data of other users [28]. Specifically, an at-
tacker generates the fingerprints of some possible data of
other users and queries the cloud by fingerprint if such
data is unique and needs to be uploaded. If no upload
is needed, then the attacker infers that other users own
the data. Another side-channel attack is to gain unautho-
rized access to data of other users [27]. Specifically, an
attacker uses the fingerprints of some sensitive data of
other users to convince the cloud of the data ownership.
To prevent side-channel attacks, CDStore adopts two-
stage deduplication, which eliminates duplicates first on
the client side and then on the server side. We require
that each CDStore server maintains a deduplication in-
dex that keeps track of which shares have been stored by
each user and how shares are deduplicated (see imple-
mentation details in §4.4). Then the two deduplication
stages are implemented as follows.
Intra-user deduplication: A CDStore client first runs
deduplication only on the data owned by the same user,
and uploads the unique data of the user to the cloud.
Before uploading shares to a cloud, the CDStore client
first checks with the CDStore server by fingerprint if it
has already uploaded the same shares. Specifically, the
CDStore client first sends the fingerprints generated from
the shares to the CDStore server. The CDStore server
then looks up its deduplication index, and replies to the
CDStore client a list of share identifiers that indicate
which shares have been uploaded by the CDStore client.
Finally, the CDStore client uploads only unique shares to
the cloud based on the list.
Inter-user deduplication: A CDStore server runs dedu-
plication on the data of all users and stores the glob-
ally unique data in the cloud storage backend. After the
CDStore server receives shares from the CDStore client,
it generates a fingerprint from each share (instead of us-
ing the one generated by the CDStore client for intra-
user deduplication), and checks if the share has already
been stored by other users by looking up the dedupli-
cation index. It stores only the unique shares that are
not yet stored at the cloud backend. It also updates the
deduplication index to keep track of which user owns the
shares. Here, we cannot directly use the fingerprint gen-
erated by the CDStore client for intra-user deduplication.
Otherwise, an attacker can launch a side-channel attack,
by using the fingerprint of a share of other users to gain
unauthorized access to the share [27, 43].
Remarks: Two-stage deduplication prevents side-
channel attacks by making deduplication patterns inde-
pendent across users’ uploads. Thus, a malicious insider
cannot infer the data content of other users through dedu-
plication occurrences.
Both intra-user and inter-user deduplications effec-
tively remove duplicates. Intra-user deduplication elimi-
nates duplicates of the same user’s data. This is effective
for backup workloads, since the same user often makes
repeated backups of the same data as different versions
[32]. Inter-user deduplication further removes duplicates
of multiple users. For example, multiple users within the
same organization may share a large proportion of busi-
ness files. Some workloads exhibit large proportions of
duplicates across different users’ data, such as VM im-
ages [31], workstation file system snapshots [42], and
backups [58]. The removal of duplicates translates to
cost savings (see §5.6).
4 CDStore Implementation
We present the implementation details of CDStore. Our
CDStore prototype is written in C++ on Linux. We
use OpenSSL [4] to implement cryptographic opera-
tions: AES-256 and SHA-256 for the encryption and
hash algorithms of convergent dispersal, respectively,
and SHA-256 for fingerprints in deduplication. We use
GF-Complete [48] to accelerate Galois Field arithmetic
in the Reed-Solomon coding of CAONT-RS.
4.1 Architectural Overview
We follow a modular approach to implement CDStore,
whose client and server architectures are shown in Fig-
ure 4. During file uploads, a CDStore client splits the
file into a sequence of secrets via the chunking module.
It then encodes each secret into n shares via the cod-
ing module. It performs intra-user deduplication, and up-
loads unique shares to the CDStore servers in n different
clouds via both client-side and server-side communica-
tion modules. To reduce network I/Os, we avoid sending
many small-size shares over the Internet. Instead, we first
batch the shares to be uploaded to each cloud in a 4MB
buffer and upload the buffer when it is full. Upon receiv-
ing the shares, each CDStore server performs inter-user
deduplication via the deduplication module and updates
the deduplication metadata via the index module. Finally,
it packs the unique shares as containers and writes the
containers to the cloud storage backend through the in-
ternal network via the container module.
File downloads work in the reverse way. A CDStore
client connects to any k clouds to request to download
a file. Each CDStore server retrieves the corresponding
containers and metadata, and returns all required shares
Chunking Coding CDStore serversComm
Files
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Storage 
backend
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Figure 4: Implementation of the CDStore architecture.
and file metadata. The CDStore client decodes the se-
crets and assembles the secrets back to the file.
4.2 Chunking
We implement both fixed-size chunking and variable-
size chunking in the chunking module of a CDStore
client, and enable variable-size chunking by default. To
make deduplication effective, the size of each secret
should be on the order of kilobytes (e.g., 8KB [62]). We
implement variable-size chunking based on Rabin finger-
printing [49], in which the average, minimum, and max-
imum secret (chunk) sizes are configured at 8KB, 2KB,
and 16KB, respectively.
4.3 Metadata Offloading
One important reliability requirement is to tolerate
client-side failures, as we expect that a CDStore client
is deployed in commodity hardware. Thus, our current
implementation makes CDStore servers keep and man-
age all metadata on behalf of CDStore clients.
When uploading a file, a CDStore client collects two
types of metadata. First, after chunking, it collects file
metadata for the upload file, including the full pathname,
file size, and number of secrets. Second, after encoding
a secret into shares, it collects share metadata for each
share, including the share size, fingerprint of the share
(for intra-user deduplication), sequence number of the
input secret, and secret size (for removing padded zeroes
when decoding the original secret).
The CDStore client uploads the file and share metadata
to the CDStore servers along with the uploaded file. The
metadata will serve as input for each CDStore server to
maintain index information (see §4.4).
We distribute metadata across all CDStore servers for
reliability. For non-sensitive information (e.g., the size
and sequence number of each secret), we can simply
replicate it, so that each CDStore server can directly use
it to manage data transfer and deduplication. However,
for sensitive information (e.g., a file’s full pathname), we
encode and disperse it via secret sharing.
4.4 Index Management
Each CDStore server uses the metadata from CDStore
clients to generate index information of the uploaded
files and keep it in the index module. There are two types
of index structures: the file index and the share index.
The file index holds the entries for all files uploaded
by different users. Each entry describes a file, identi-
fied by the full pathname (which has been encoded as
described in §4.3) and the user identifier provided by a
CDStore client. We hash the full pathname and the user
identifier to obtain a unique key for the entry. The entry
stores a reference to the file recipe, which describes the
complete details of the file, including the fingerprint of
each share (for retrieving the share) and the size of the
corresponding secret (for decoding the original secret).
The file recipe will be saved at the cloud backend by the
container module (see §4.5).
The share index holds the entries for all unique shares
of different files. Each entry describes a share, and is
keyed by the share fingerprint. It stores the reference
to the container that holds the share. To support intra-
user deduplication, each entry also holds a list of user
identifiers to distinguish who owns the share, as well as
a reference count for each user to support deletion.
Our prototype manages file and share indices using
LevelDB [26], an open-source key-value store. Lev-
elDB maintains key-value pairs in a log-structured merge
(LSM) tree [44], which supports fast random inserts, up-
dates, and deletes, and uses a Bloom filter [18] and a
block cache to speed up lookups. We can also leverage
the snapshot feature provided by LevelDB to store peri-
odic snapshots in the cloud backend for reliability. We
currently do not consider this feature in our evaluation.
4.5 Container Management
The container module maintains two types of contain-
ers in the storage backend: share containers, which hold
the globally unique shares, and recipe containers, which
hold the file recipes of different files. We cap the con-
tainer size at 4MB, except that if a file recipe is very
large (due to a particularly large file), we keep the file
recipe in a single container and allow the container to go
beyond 4MB. We avoid splitting a file recipe in multiple
containers to reduce I/Os.
We make two optimizations to reduce the I/O overhead
of storing and fetching the containers via the storage
backend. First, we maintain in-memory buffers for hold-
ing shares and file recipes before writing them into con-
tainers. We organize the shares or file recipes by users,
so that each container contains only the data of a single
user. This retains spatial locality of workloads [62]. Sec-
ond, we maintain a least-recently-used (LRU) disk cache
to hold the most recently accessed containers to reduce
I/Os to the storage backend.
4.6 Multi-Threading
Advances of multi-core architectures enable us to ex-
ploit multi-threading for parallelization. First, the client-
side coding module uses multi-threading for the CPU-
intensive encoding/decoding operations of CAONT-RS.
We parallelize encoding/decoding at the secret level: in
file uploads, we pass each secret output from the chunk-
ing module to one of the threads for encoding; in file
downloads, we pass the shares of a secret received by the
communication module to a thread for decoding.
Furthermore, both client-side and server-side commu-
nication modules use multi-threading to fully utilize the
network transfer bandwidth. The client-side communica-
tion module creates multiple threads, one for each cloud,
to upload/download shares. The server-side communi-
cation module also uses multiple threads to send/receive
shares for different CDStore clients.
4.7 Open Issues
Our current CDStore prototype implements the basic
backup and restore operations. We discuss some open
implementation issues.
Storage efficiency: We can reclaim more storage space
via different techniques in addition to deduplication. For
example, garbage collection can reclaim space of ex-
pired backups. By exploiting historical information, we
can accelerate garbage collection in deduplication stor-
age [25]. Compression also effectively reduces storage
space of both data [58] and metadata (e.g., file recipes
[41]). Implementations of garbage collection and com-
pression are posed as future work.
Scalability: We currently deploy one CDStore server per
cloud. In large-scale deployment, we can run CDStore
servers on multiple VMs per cloud and evenly distribute
user backup jobs among them for load balance. Imple-
menting a distributed deduplication system is beyond the
scope of this paper.
Consistency: Our prototype is tailored for backup work-
loads that are immutable. We do not address consistency
issues due to concurrent updates as mentioned in [13].
5 Evaluation
We evaluate CDStore under different testbeds and work-
loads. We also analyze its monetary cost advantages.
5.1 Testbeds
We consider three types of testbeds in our evaluation.
(i) Local machines: We use two machines: Local-
Xeon, which has a quad-core 2.4GHz Intel Xeon E5530
and 16GB RAM, and Local-i5, which has a quad-core
3.4GHz Intel Core i5-3570 and 8GB RAM. Both ma-
chines run 64-bit Ubuntu 12.04.2 LTS. We use them to
evaluate the encoding performance of CDStore clients.
(ii) LAN: We configure a LAN of multiple machines
with the same configuration as Local-i5. All nodes are
connected via a 1Gb/s switch. We run CDStore clients
and servers on different machines. Each CDStore server
mounts the storage backend on a local 7200RPM SATA
hard disk. We use the LAN testbed to evaluate the data
transfer performance of CDStore.
(iii) Cloud: We deploy a CDStore client on the Local-
Xeon machine (in Hong Kong) and connect it via the In-
ternet to four commercial clouds (i.e., n = 4): Ama-
zon (in Singapore), Google (in Singapore), Azure (in
Hong Kong), and Rackspace (in Hong Kong). We set up
the testbed in the same continent to limit the differences
among the client-to-server connection bandwidths. Each
cloud runs a VM with similar configurations: four CPU
cores and 4∼15GB RAM. We use the cloud testbed to
evaluate the real deployment performance of CDStore.
5.2 Datasets
We use two real-world datasets to drive our evaluation.
(i) FSL: This dataset is published by the File systems
and Storage Lab (FSL) at Stony Brook University [3,57].
Due to the large dataset size, we use the Fslhomes
dataset in 2013, containing daily snapshots of nine stu-
dents’ home directories from a shared network file sys-
tem. We select the snapshots every seven days (which are
not continuous) to mimic weekly backups. The dataset is
represented in 48-bit chunk fingerprints and correspond-
ing chunk sizes obtained from variable-size chunking.
Our filtered FSL dataset contains 16 weekly backups of
all nine users, covering a total of 8.11TB of data.
(ii) VM: This dataset is collected by ourselves and
is unpublished. It consists of weekly snapshots of 156
VM images for students in a university programming
course in Spring 2014. We create a 10GB master image
with Ubuntu 12.04.2 LTS and clone all VMs. We treat
each VM image snapshot as a weekly backup of a user.
The dataset is represented in SHA-1 fingerprints on 4KB
fixed-size chunks. It spans 16 weeks, totaling 24.38TB
of data. For fair comparisons, we remove all zero-filled
chunks (which dominate in VM images [31]) from the
dataset, and the size reduces to 11.12TB.
5.3 Encoding Performance
We evaluate the computational overhead of CAONT-
RS when encoding secrets into shares. We compare
CAONT-RS with two variants: (i) AONT-RS [52], which
builds on Rivest’s AONT [53] and does not support dedu-
plication, and (ii) our prior proposal CAONT-RS-Rivest
[37], which uses Rivest’s AONT as in AONT-RS and
replaces the random key in AONT-RS with a SHA-256
hash for convergent dispersal. CAONT-RS uses OAEP-
based AONT instead (see §3.2).
We conduct our experiments on the Local-Xeon and
Local-i5 machines. We create 2GB of random data in
memory (to remove I/O overhead), generate secrets using
variable-size chunking with an average chunk size 8KB,
and encode them into shares. We measure the encoding
speed, defined as the ratio of the original data size to the
total time of encoding all secrets into shares. Our results
1 2 3 4
0
100
200
300
400 Local-Xeon
 # of Threads
 S
p e
e d
 ( M
B
/ s
)
1 2 3 4
Local-i5
 # of Threads
 
 
CAONT-RS  AONT-RS  CAONT-RS-Rivest
(a) Varying number of threads
4 8 12 16 20
0
50
100
150
200 Local-Xeon
 n
 S
p e
e d
 ( M
B
/ s
)
4 8 12 16 20
Local-i5
 n
 
 
CAONT-RS  AONT-RS  CAONT-RS-Rivest
(b) Varying n
Figure 5: Encoding speeds of a CDStore client.
are averaged over 10 runs. We observe similar results for
decoding, and omit them here.
We first examine the benefits of multi-threading (see
§4.6). Figure 5(a) shows the encoding speeds versus the
number of threads, while we fix (n, k) = (4, 3). The
encoding speeds of all schemes increase with the num-
ber of threads. If two encoding threads are used, the
encoding speeds of CAONT-RS are 83MB/s on Local-
Xeon and 183MB/s on Local-i5. Also, OAEP-based
AONT in CAONT-RS brings remarkable performance
gains. Compared to CAONT-RS-Rivest, which performs
encryptions on small words based on Rivest’s AONT,
CAONT-RS improves the encoding speed by 40∼61%
on Local-Xeon and 54∼61% on Local-i5; even though
compared to AONT-RS, which uses one fewer hash op-
eration, CAONT-RS still increases the encoding speed by
12∼35% on Local-Xeon and 19∼27% on Local-i5.
We next evaluate the impact of n (number of clouds).
We vary n from 4 to 20, and fix two encoding threads.
We configure k as the largest integer that satisfies kn ≤ 34
(e.g., n = 4 implies k = 3), so as to maintain a similar
storage blowup due to secret sharing. Figure 5(b) shows
the encoding speeds versus n. The encoding speeds of
all schemes slightly decrease with n (e.g., by 8% from
n = 4 to 20 for CAONT-RS on Local-i5), since more
encoded shares are generated via Reed-Solomon codes
for a larger n. However, Reed-Solomon coding only
accounts for small overhead compared to AONT, which
runs cryptographic operations. We have also tested other
ratios of kn and obtained similar speed results.
The above results only report encoding speeds, while
a CDStore client performs both chunking and encod-
ing operations when uploading data to multiple clouds.
We measure the combined chunking (using variable-size
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Figure 6: Deduplication efficiency of CDStore.
chunking) and encoding speeds with (n, k) = (4, 3) and
two encoding threads, and find that the combined speeds
drop by around 16%, to 69MB/s on Local-Xeon and
154MB/s on Local-i5.
5.4 Deduplication Efficiency
We evaluate the effectiveness of both intra-user and inter-
user deduplications (see §3.3). We extract the deduplica-
tion characteristics of both datasets, assuming that they
are stored as weekly backups. We define four types of
data: (i) logical data, the original user data to be encoded
into shares, (ii) logical shares, the shares before two-
stage deduplication, (iii) transferred shares, the shares
that are transferred over Internet after intra-user dedupli-
cation, and (iv) physical shares, the shares that are finally
stored after two-stage deduplication. We also define two
metrics: (i) intra-user deduplication saving, which is one
minus the ratio of the size of the transferred shares to
that of the logical shares, and (ii) inter-user deduplica-
tion saving, which is one minus the ratio of the size of
the physical shares to that of the transferred shares. We
fix (n, k) = (4, 3). Figure 6 summarizes the results.
Figure 6(a) first shows the intra-user and inter-user
deduplication savings. The intra-user deduplication sav-
ings are very high for both datasets, especially in subse-
quent backups after the first week (at least 94.2% for FSL
and at least 98.0% for VM). The reason is that the users
only modify or add a small portion of data. The sav-
ings translate to performance gains in file uploads (see
§5.5). However, the inter-user deduplication savings dif-
fer across datasets. For the FSL dataset, the savings fall
to no more than 12.9%. In contrast, for the VM dataset,
the saving for the first backup reaches 93.4%, mainly be-
cause the VM images are initially installed with the same
operating system. The savings for subsequent backups
then drop to the range between 11.8% and 47.0%. Nev-
ertheless, the VM dataset shows higher savings for sub-
sequent backups than the FSL dataset; we conjecture the
reason is that students make similar changes to the VM
images when doing programming assignments.
Figure 6(b) then shows cumulative data and share sizes
before and after intra-user and inter-user deduplications.
After 16 weekly backups, for the FSL dataset, the total
size of physical shares is only 0.51TB, about 6.3% of the
logical data size; for the VM dataset, the total size of
physical shares is only 0.09TB, about 0.8% of the logi-
cal data size. This shows that dispersal-level redundancy
(i.e., nk =
4
3 ) is significantly offset by removing content-
level redundancy via two-stage deduplication. Also, if
we compare the sizes of transferred shares and physical
shares for the VM dataset, we see that inter-user dedupli-
cation is crucial for reducing storage space.
5.5 Transfer Speeds
Single-client baseline transfer speeds: We first evalu-
ate the baseline transfer speed of a CDStore client us-
ing both LAN and cloud testbeds. Each testbed has one
CDStore client and four CDStore servers with (n, k) =
(4, 3). We first upload 2GB of unique data (i.e., no dupli-
cates), then upload another 2GB of duplicate data iden-
tical to the previous one, and finally download the 2GB
data from three CDStore servers (for the cloud testbed,
we choose Google, Azure, and Rackspace for down-
loads). We measure the upload and download speeds,
averaged over 10 runs.
Figure 7(a) presents the results. On the LAN testbed,
the upload speed for unique data is 77MB/s. Our mea-
surements find that the effective network speed in our
LAN testbed is around 110MB/s. Thus, the upload speed
for unique data is close to kn of the effective network
speed. Uploading duplicate data has speed 150MB/s.
Since it does not transfer actual data after intra-user
deduplication, the performance is bounded by the chunk-
ing and CAONT-RS encoding operations (see §5.3). The
download speed is 99MB/s, about 10% less than the ef-
fective network speed. The reason is that the CDStore
servers need to retrieve data from the disk backend be-
fore returning it to the CDStore client.
On the cloud testbed, the upload and download per-
formance is limited by the Internet bandwidth. For ref-
erences, we measure the upload and download speeds
of each individual cloud when transferring 2GB of
unique data divided in 4MB units (see §4.1), and Ta-
ble 2 presents the averaged results over 10 runs. Since
CDStore transfers data through multiple clouds in paral-
lel via multi-threading, its upload speed of unique data
and download speed are higher than those of individual
clouds (e.g., Amazon and Google). The upload speed for
unique data is smaller than the download speed because
Cloud Upload speed Download speed
Amazon 5.87 (0.19) 4.45 (0.30)
Google 4.99 (0.23) 4.45 (0.21)
Azure 19.59 (1.20) 13.78 (0.72)
Rackspace 19.42 (1.06) 12.93 (1.47)
Table 2: Measured speeds (MB/s) of each of four clouds,
in terms of the average (standard deviation) over 10 runs.
of sending redundancy and connecting to more clouds.
The upload speed for duplicate data is over 9× that for
unique data, and this difference is more significant than
on the LAN testbed.
Single-client trace-driven transfer speeds: We now
evaluate the upload and download speeds of a single
CDStore client using datasets as opposed to unique and
duplicate data above. We focus on the FSL dataset,
which allows us to test the effect of variable-size chunk-
ing. We again consider both LAN and cloud testbeds
with (n, k) = (4, 3). Since the FSL dataset only has
chunk fingerprints and chunk sizes, we reconstruct a
chunk by writing the fingerprint value repeatedly to a
chunk with the specified size, so as to preserve content
similarity. Each chunk is treated as a secret, which will
be encoded into shares. We first upload all backups to
CDStore servers, followed by downloading them. To re-
duce evaluation time, we only run part of the dataset. On
the LAN testbed, we run seven weekly backups for five
users (1.06TB data in total). We feed the first week of
backups of each user one by one through the CDStore
client, followed by the second week of backups, and so
on. On the other hand, on the cloud testbed, we run two
weekly backups for a single user (21.35GB data in total).
Figure 7(b) presents three results: (i) the average up-
load speed for the first backup (averaged over five users
for the LAN testbed), (ii) the average upload speed for
the subsequent backups, and (iii) the average download
speed of all backups. The presented results are obtained
from a single run, yet the evaluation time is long enough
to give steady-state results. We compare the results with
those for unique and duplicate data in Figure 7(a).
We see that the upload speed for the first backup ex-
ceeds that for unique data (e.g., by 19% on the LAN
testbed), mainly because the first backup contains dupli-
cates, which can be removed by intra-user deduplication
(see Figure 6(a)). The upload speed for the subsequent
backups approximates to that for duplicate data, as most
duplicates are again removed by intra-user deduplication.
The trace-driven download speed is lower than the
baseline one in Figure 7(a) (e.g., by 10% on the LAN
testbed), since deduplication now introduces chunk frag-
mentation [38] for subsequent backups. Nevertheless,
we find that the variance of the download speeds of the
backups is very small (not shown in the figure), although
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Figure 7: Upload and download speeds of a CDStore client (the numbers are
the speeds in MB/s).
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of multiple CDStore clients.
the number of accessed containers increases for subse-
quent backups. The download speed will gradually de-
grade due to fragmentation as we store more backups.
We do not explicitly address fragmentation in this work.
Multi-client aggregate upload speeds: We evaluate the
aggregate upload speed when multiple CDStore clients
connect to multiple CDStore servers. We mainly con-
sider data uploads on the LAN testbed, in which we vary
the number of CDStore clients, each hosted on a dedi-
cated machine, and configure four CDStore servers with
(n, k) = (4, 3). All CDStore clients perform uploads
concurrently, such that each of them first uploads 2GB
of unique data, and then uploads another 2GB of dupli-
cate data. We measure the aggregate upload speed, de-
fined as the total upload size (i.e., 2GB times the number
of clients) divided by the duration when all clients finish
uploads. Our results are averaged over 10 runs.
Figure 8 presents the aggregate upload speeds for
both unique and duplicate data, which we observe in-
crease with the number of CDStore clients. For unique
data, the aggregate upload speed reaches 282MB/s for
eight CDStore clients. The speed is limited by the net-
work bandwidth and disk I/O, where the latter is for the
CDStore servers to write containers to disk. If we ex-
clude disk I/O (i.e., without writing data), the aggregate
upload speed can reach 310MB/s (not shown in the fig-
ure), which approximates to the aggregate effective Eth-
ernet speed of k = 3 CDStore servers. For duplicate
data, there is no actual data transfer, so the aggregate up-
load speed can reach 572MB/s. Note that the knee point
at four CDStore clients is due to the saturation of CPU
resources in each CDStore server.
5.6 Cost Analysis
We now analyze the cost saving of CDStore. We com-
pare it with two baseline systems: (i) an AONT-RS-based
multi-cloud system that has the same levels of reliability
and security as CDStore but does not support deduplica-
tion, and (ii) a single-cloud system that incurs zero re-
dundancy for reliability, but encrypts user data with ran-
dom keys and does not support deduplication. We aim
to show that CDStore incurs less cost than AONT-RS
through deduplication; even though CDStore incurs re-
dundancy for reliability, it still incurs less cost than the
single-cloud system without deduplication.
We develop a tool to estimate the monetary costs us-
ing the pricing models of Amazon EC2 [1] and S3 [2]
in September 2014. Free charges apply to data trans-
fers between co-locating EC2 instances and S3 storage,
and also inbound transfers to both EC2 and S3. We only
study backup operations, and do not consider restore op-
erations as they are relatively infrequent in practice. Note
that both EC2 and S3 follow tiered pricing, so the exact
charges depend on the actual usage. Our tool takes into
account tiered pricing in cost calculations. For CDStore,
we also consider the storage costs of file recipes.
We briefly describe how we derive the EC2 and S3
costs. For EC2, we consider the category of high-
utilization reserved instances, which are priced based on
an upfront fee and hourly bills. We focus on two types
of instances, namely compute-optimized and storage-
optimized, to host CDStore servers on all clouds. Each
instance charges around US$60∼1,300 per month, de-
pending on the CPU, memory, and storage settings. Note
that both file and share indices (see §4.4) are kept in the
local storage of an EC2 instance, and the total index size
is determined by how much data is stored and how much
data can be deduplicated. Our tool chooses the cheap-
est instance that can keep the entire indices according
to the storage size and deduplication efficiency, both of
which can be estimated in practice. On the other hand,
S3 storage is mainly priced based on storage size, and
it charges around US$30 per TB per month. Note that
in backup operations, the costs due to outbound transfer
(e.g., a CDStore server replies the intra-user deduplica-
tion status to a CDStore client) and storage requests (e.g.,
PUT) are negligible compared to VM and storage costs.
We consider a case study. An organization schedules
weekly backups for its user data, for a retention time
of half a year (26 weeks). We fix (n, k) = (4, 3) (i.e.,
we host four EC2 instances for CDStore servers). We
vary the weekly backup size and the deduplication ratio,
where the latter is defined as the ratio of the size of logi-
cal shares to the size of physical shares (see §5.4).
Figure 9(a) shows the cost savings of CDStore ver-
sus different weekly backup sizes, while we fix the
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Figure 9: Cost savings of CDStore over an AONT-RS-
based multi-cloud system and a single-cloud system.
deduplication ratio as 10× [58]. The cost savings in-
crease with the weekly backup size. For example, if we
keep a weekly backup size of 16TB, the single-cloud
and AONT-RS-based systems incur total storage costs
(with tiered pricing) of around US$12,250/month and
US$16,400/month, respectively; CDStore incurs addi-
tional VM costs of around US$660/month but reduces
the storage cost to around US$2,880/month, resulting in
around US$3,540/month in total and thus achieving at
least 70% of cost savings as a whole. The cost saving of
CDStore over AONT-RS is higher than that over a sin-
gle cloud, as the former introduces dispersal-level redun-
dancy for fault tolerance. The increase slows down as the
weekly backup size further increases, since the overhead
of file recipes becomes significant when the total backup
size is large while the backups have a high deduplica-
tion ratio [41]. Note that the jagged curves are due to the
switch of the cheapest EC2 instance to fit the indices.
Figure 9(b) shows the cost savings of CDStore versus
different deduplication ratios, where the weekly backup
size is fixed at 16TB. The cost saving increases with the
deduplication ratio. The saving is about 70∼80% when
the deduplication ratio is between 10× and 50×.
6 Related Work
Multi-cloud storage: Existing multi-cloud storage sys-
tems mainly focus on data availability in the presence of
cloud failures and vendor lock-ins. For example, Safe-
Store [33], RACS [5], Scalia [45], and NCCloud [29] dis-
perse redundancy across multiple clouds using RAID or
erasure coding. Some multi-cloud systems additionally
address security. HAIL [19] proposes proof of retriev-
ability to support remote integrity checking against data
corruptions. MetaStorage [12] and SPANStore [60] pro-
vide both availability and integrity guarantees by repli-
cating data across multiple clouds using quorum tech-
niques [39], but do not address confidentiality. Hy-
bris [23] achieves confidentiality by dispersing encrypted
data over multiple public clouds via erasure coding and
keeping secret keys in a private cloud.
Applications of secret sharing: We discuss several se-
cret sharing algorithms in §2. They have been real-
ized by storage systems. POTSHARDS [56] realizes
Shamir’s scheme [54] for archival storage. ICStore
[21] achieves confidentiality via key-based encryption,
where the keys are distributed across multiple clouds via
Shamir’s scheme. DepSky [13] and SCFS [14] distribute
keys across clouds using SSMS [34]. Cleversafe [52]
uses AONT-RS to achieve security with reduced storage
space. All the above systems rely on random inputs to
secret sharing, and do not address deduplication.
Deduplication security: Convergent encryption [24]
provides confidentiality guarantees for deduplication
storage, and has been adopted in various storage sys-
tems [6, 7, 22, 55, 59]. However, the key management
overheads of convergent encryption are significant [36].
Bellare et al. [10] generalize convergent encryption into
Message-locked encryption (MLE) and provide formal
security analysis on confidentiality and tag consistency.
The same authors also prototype a server-aided MLE
system DupLESS [9], which uses more complicated en-
cryption keys to prevent brute-force attacks. DupLESS
maintains the keys in a dedicated key server, yet the key
server is a single point of failure.
Client-side inter-user deduplication poses new secu-
rity threats, including the side-channel attack [27,28] and
some specific attacks against Dropbox [43]. CDStore ad-
dresses this problem through two-stage deduplication. A
previous work [61] proposes a similar two-stage dedu-
plication approach (i.e., inner-VM and cross-VM dedu-
plications) to reduce system resources for VM backups,
while our approach is mainly to address security.
7 Conclusions
We propose a multi-cloud storage system called CDStore
for organizations to outsource backup and archival stor-
age to public cloud vendors, with three goals in mind:
reliability, security, and cost efficiency. The core de-
sign of CDStore is convergent dispersal, which aug-
ments secret sharing with the deduplication capabil-
ity. CDStore also adopts two-stage deduplication to
achieve bandwidth and storage savings and prevent side-
channel attacks. We extensively evaluate CDStore via
different testbeds and datasets from both performance
and cost perspectives. We demonstrate that dedupli-
cation enables CDStore to achieve cost savings. The
source code of our CDStore prototype is available at
http://ansrlab.cse.cuhk.edu.hk/software/cdstore.
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